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In 1986, before the Internet became a household word, the federal Office of
Technology Assessment warned that "new information and communications
technologies available today are challenging the intellectual property system in
ways that may only be resolvable with substantial changes in the system or
with new mechanisms to allocate both rights and rewards."1 The nascent tech-
nologies at issue then seem prosaic today: videocassette recorders, two-way
interactive cable, fiber optic communications, and satellite television.
Though the Office of Technology Assessment's 1986 report did not ad-
dress intellectual property issues relating to the Internet, 2 the underlying con-
cern that gave rise to its report remains as real today as it did then: "Once a
relatively slow and ponderous process, technological change is now outpacing
the legal structure that governs the system, and is creating pressures on Con-
gress to adjust the law to accommodate these changes." 3 Today, as before,
there are calls for changes in our system of intellectual property rights, and
pressure for lawmakers to "do something."4 Napster's digital music file-
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1. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 3 (1986) (hereinafter OTA REPORT).
2. See id. at 68-69, 111, 139-42. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the Defense Department's Advanced
Research Projects Agency led an effort to connect computers at research laboratories across the country
to allow academic and government scientists and others to share computer resources. See generally
KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET
(1996). That effort, which led to ARPANET and eventually to the Internet, was well along by the time
of the Office of Technology Assessment's 1986 report, but it appears that intellectual property issues
raised by the distribution of content over the Internet were just beginning to be recognized.
3. OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See, e.g., John Markoff, The Concept of Copyright Fights for Internet Survival, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 2000, at Al; Editorial, The Remedy for Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2000, at A22 ("Can,
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sharing system is but the most recent high-profile example of the way in which
contemporary technological developments have challenged traditional legal
principles. 5 But the question of how the law should adapt or change in response
to new technology is a difficult and pressing one: As the Office of Technology
Assessment report observed, "because the new information and communication
technologies do not fit neatly within the existing framework of the law, the
balance [between public and private interests] may be harder to achieve in the
future."6
Indeed, fundamental legal questions arising from the explosive growth of
the Internet are just now beginning to be addressed. Should electronic signa-
tures and records have the same legal status as wet-ink signatures and paper
records?7 Where should there be jurisdiction to hear and to resolve disputes
arising from information transmitted or transactions conducted over the Inter-
net? 8 Are Internet service providers publishers of the content they carry, or are
they mere common carriers akin to public utilities?9 What role should govern-




centuries be applied to the technology and
intellectual property of the 21't Century?").
5. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 293 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding Napster con-
tributorily liable for copyright infringement to the extent it has knowledge of specific infringing files,
knows or should know that such files are available on its system, and fails to prevent viral distribution of
the works); Testimony of Hank Berry, Chief Executive Officer, Napster, Inc., before the Senate Judici-
ary Comm. (July 11, 2000), available at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/7112000_hb.htm.
6. OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. In 1995, the Clinton Administration's Information Infra-
structure Task Force's Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights echoed this theme: "Changes in
technology generate new industries and new methods for reproduction and dissemination of works of
authorship, which may present new opportunities for authors, but also create additional challenges.
Copyright law has had to respond to these challenges, from Gutenberg's moveable type printing press to
digital audio recorders and everything in between." WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 7 (Sept. 1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov (hereinafter IITF
REPORT). That Working Group also concluded that "[w]e are once again faced with significant changes
in technology that upset the balance that currently exists under the Copyright Act. Our goal is to main-
tain the existing balance." Id. at 14.
7. See, e.g., Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001
(2000).
8. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that defen-
dant's mere presence on the World Wide Web was insufficient to confer jurisdiction under the minimum
contacts standard); Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (concluding that jurisdiction over a defendant based solely on its operation of a website depended
on "the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the
Web site").
9. See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding, under the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Internet service provider not liable for defamatory statement);
Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1024 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that
defendant had not demonstrated that Internet service provider qualified as a public utility under Ohio
law). Congress has responded to this debate by establishing "safe harbors" under certain circumstances
for Internet service providers. See, e.g., The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1) ("[n]o provider...of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider"); The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.) (providing immunity from monetary damages arising from copyright infringement for
"online service providers" that qualify under certain safe harbors). But cf Union des Etudiants Juifs
Law and Technology
ments play in protecting privacy and personal information that may be col-
lected and shared with ease over the Internet? 10 And how can governments
regulate criminal activity - such as fraud, child pornography, terrorist acts, and
illegal drug trafficking - that may be conducted through the use of modem
computer tools and the Internet? 11
The Internet and new information technologies likewise challenge tradi-
tional notions of intellectual property law. For instance, to what extent are
works available on the Internet protected by copyright law, and what consti-
tutes "fair use" of such works? 12 What should the relationships, if any, be
among trademarks, domain names, metatags, and unfair competition law?
13
Additionally, should certain business methods, such as those involving the use
of the Internet, be patentable?
14
These sorts of questions, together with the emerging view that "many of
the intellectual property rules and practices that evolved in the world of physi-
cal artifacts do not work well in the digital environment,"' 5 inspired The Digi-
de France and Ligue Contre la Racisme et L'Antisemitisme v. Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo! France,
T.G.I. Paris, Ordonnance de refere du 20 novembre 2000, at
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf (holding by French court ordering Yahoo! 's
English-language U.S. site to comply with a French law prohibiting the display or sale of objects that
incite racial hatred and in particular to block French users' access to Nazi-era memorabilia offered on
the site) (English translations of the decision available at http://www.gigalaw.com/library/france-yahoo-
2000-11-20.html). For further discussion of the French Yahoo! case, see, e.g., Kurt A. Wimmer, E-
Litigation: Internet Jurisdiction, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 26, 2001, at A12.
10. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN
THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000); Gramm-Leach Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999, tit. V, §§ 501 et seq., Pub. L. 106-102 (1999); Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998,
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6505; Council Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281).
11. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF
UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET (2000), available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov (hereinafter THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER); Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal
Law in Cyberspace, 142 U. PA. L. REV. - (April 2001).
12. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 293 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming in
relevant part district court's preliminary injunction against Napster as a contributory and vicarious copy-
right infringer as a result of its music file-sharing system); see also Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972
F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 425 (2000) (raising issue of how to characterize
electronic "copies" of copyrighted works); The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, supra note 9
(prohibiting the circumvention of copyright protection systems and the manufacture, import, sale, or
distribution of devices or services used for such circumvention).
13. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th
Cir. 1999); The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1125 (2001).
14. See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding data processing system to be patentable subject matter), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1093 (1999); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp.2d 1228 (W.D. Wash. 1999)
(enjoining Bamesandnoble.com from using Amazon.com's patented one-click electronic shopping tech-
nology), rev'd, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For an example of commentary in the public press, see
James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 12, 2000 ("the patent system is in crisis.
A series of unplanned mutations have transformed patents into a positive threat to the digital economy").
15. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE at ix (Comm.
on Intellectual Property Rights and the Emerging Information Infrastructure, Computer Sciences and
Telecommunications Board, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics and Applications, National
Yale Law & Policy Review
tal Dilemma. Authored by a committee established by the Computer Science
and Telecommunications Board of the National Research Council, The Digital
Dilemma combines legal, policy, economic, and technical analyses to identify
issues and to make recommendations relating to the impact of new information
technology and digital information on our intellectual property system.
This Review first focuses on The Digital Dilemma's policy analysis and
recommendations, paying particular attention to the authors' conclusions that
relate to how the law should adapt to changes presented by the Internet and
new information technologies. The second part of this Review attempts to put
these recommendations in a broader context by sketching other instances in
which the law (at least in the United States) has had to respond to changes in
technology. That context suggests that the recommendations made in The
Digital Dilemma can be viewed as consistent with a more general, historical
model in which the law and legal institutions typically react slowly and incre-
mentally in response to new technology.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW MEETS THE INTERNET
The authors of The Digital Dilemma faced a daunting task. Formed in
1997, the National Research Council's Committee on Intellectual Property
Rights and the Emerging Information Infrastructure was designed to represent
a "microcosm of the diverse community of interest" drawn from industry, aca-
demia, and the library and information science community. 16 Its mandate was
an ambitious one: "to assess issues and derive research topics and policy rec-
ommendations related to the nature, evolution, and use of the Internet and other
networks, and to the generation, distribution, and protection of content ac-
cessed through networks." 17 In pursuing its broad mission, the Committee had
to cope with the rapid pace of technological and other changes associated with
the Internet (including changes in the law and in relevant business models),
which meant that findings and conclusions proffered one day might well be
outdated the next. Overcoming this triple-whammy of circumstances - drafting
by committee while striving to deal comprehensively with a moving target -
was no small feat.
Rising to the challenge, the authors of The Digital Dilemma have done a
Research Council ed., 2000) (hereinafter THE DIGITAL DILEMMA). The National Research Council is the
principal operating agency of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engi-
neering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering commu-
nities. It is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine.
16. Id. at xi; see also id. at 27 ("the members of the study committee were selected to provide the
diverse expertise needed to ensure that stakeholders' wide-ranging perspectives were represented").
17. Id. at x; see also id. at xi, Box P.1 (outlining the Committee's Statement of Task). Elsewhere,
the book states that its purpose is "to explain and demystify the underlying technology trends, explore
the range of technological and business tools that may be useful, and recommend a variety of actions
that can be taken to help ensure that the benefits of the information infrastructure are realized for rights
holders and society as a whole." Id. at 27.
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commendable job of covering the many intellectual property issues raised by
the Internet and other network technologies. The book begins with an overview
of the basic issues presented by emerging digital and network technologies,
noting, for example, that, unlike access to traditional media (reading a book,
watching a movie, or listening to a CD), access to digital works inevitably re-
quires the making of a copy, and that, unlike copying traditional works, copy-
ing digital works is easy, inexpensive, and produces perfect copies. Add to that
the fact that computer networks now make global distribution of that informa-
tion inexpensive and nearly instantaneous, and one can easily see how existing
copyright law, which might have prohibited (or at least tolerated) the individ-
ual copying contemplated in the analog world of traditional media, might be
ill-suited to deal with the sort of mass copying rendered simple and common-
place on the Internet.
Further complicating these issues, as the book's authors point out, are the
wide-ranging and often conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders, which
range from intellectual property creators to intellectual property distributors,
schools and libraries, the general public, and other consumers and producers of
intellectual property (governmental organizations, private sector organizations,
journalists, and standards organizations). 18 Recognizing and reconciling these
diverse interests - and the need to view the issues through the lenses of tech-
nology, law, economics, psychology and sociology, and public policy - are
important first steps in the balancing exercise that is at the heart of the current
digital policy debate, and The Digital Dilemma's compendium of stakeholder
concerns and multiplicity of perspectives are noteworthy contributions to that
debate.
A. An Example of the Digital Dilemma: The Challenge of Digital Music
Intellectual property issues arising from online content, of course, do not
arise in a vacuum or in the abstract, and the authors of The Digital Dilemma
use the modern-day "maelstrom" over digital music as a springboard to analyze
many of the issues presented. 19 Legal and policy controversies surrounding
digital music place in sharp relief the issues that arise with regard to digital in-
tellectual property generally, such as the need to distribute digital information
while retaining control over it, the important struggle over standards and for-
mats, and the rise and fall of different business models that fluctuate in re-
sponse to how the new technology changes the previous balance of power. For
these reasons, the authors view digital music as intellectual property's canary
in the coal mine; the problem is, what is this canary telling us? As the authors
not so helpfully note, "[s]omething is about to happen, but will it be a disaster
18. See id. at 61-75.
19. See id. at 76.
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or an opportunity?" But the historical perspective they offer suggests some ba-
sis for optimism:
New technology and new business models for delivering
content are almost always greeted with the belief that they
will destroy the existing market. In 17 th century England, the
emergence of lending libraries was seen as the death knell of
book stores; in the 2 0 th century, photocopying was seen as the
end of the publishing business, and videotape the end of the
movie business. Yet in each case, the new development pro-
duced a new market far larger than the impact it had on the
existing market. Lending libraries gave inexpensive access to
books that were too expensive to purchase, thereby helping to
make literacy widespread and vastly increasing the sale of
books. Similarly, the ability to photocopy makes the printed
material in a library more valuable to consumers, while
videotapes have significantly increased viewing of movies.
20
Unfortunately, the authors hazard no guesses as to the outcome for digital
music, though the central insight about innovation leading to an increase in the
market, rather than a decrease, is surely worth bearing in mind, particularly by
those most immediately threatened by the new technology.
Still, the question remains: What can be done about the widespread copy-
ing and distribution of copyrighted works? Here, the authors offer a perceptive
primer on different business models and technical protection mechanisms that
can be used to minimize digital piracy. In the realm of business models, for ex-
ample, the book identifies three potentially promising efforts: making digital
content easier and cheaper to buy than to steal (because "[t]he key product is
not only the song; it is also the speed, reliability, and convenience of access to
it" 21); using digital content to promote the traditional product (giving away free
songs to sell the album or CD); and giving away digital content and focusing
on auxiliary markets (giving away content to sell concert attendance and re-
lated merchandise). In the area of technical protection methods, the authors fo-
cus on digital watermarking technologies (to help identify the copyright owner
and trace the source of redistribution) and specialized hardware schemes that
prevent unauthorized copying. The authors acknowledge the many difficulties
associated with these forms of technical protection mechanisms, not the least
of which is that they can be and are routinely defeated. Whether these new
business models and technological responses to digital music are harbingers of
a "radical shift in power"22 remains to be seen, but there is little doubt that
20. Id. at 78-79 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 81.
22. Id. at 90.
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struggles over protecting intellectual property are likely to continue to be in-
tense in the years to come.
B. Explaining the Digital Dilemma
The central chapters of The Digital Dilemma set forth the core of the
authors' analysis: the importance of copyright in ensuring public access to
creative works; the challenges to public access presented by digital informa-
tion; the need to re-define or to adapt concepts of private use and fair use in the
context of digital information; and the roles of technical protection mecha-
nisms and business models as ways to protect digital information. The authors
present many sound suggestions, supported by detailed analyses. For example,
they recommend development of a copyright education program23 and further
research on the economic impacts of copyright and illegal commercial copy-
ing. 24 Other recommendations tend to be straightforward in concept, but po-
tentially complex in practice. On the issue of public access, for example, the
authors recommend that stakeholder representatives "convene to begin a dis-
cussion of models for public access to information that are mutually workable
in the context of the widespread use of licensing and technical protection serv-
ices."25 This is no doubt a good idea, but precisely how the relevant parties will
come together and reach agreement is a practical question that is not easily re-
solved.
Other conclusions and recommendations provided in the book are more
provocative. The authors suggest re-defining, to account for changes arising
from our new digital environment, the concepts of "publication,
26 "fair use, ' 27
"author,, 28 and even "copy., 29 The emergence of digital information and new
communications technologies no doubt tests the definitional architecture of in-
tellectual property law, but it is not clear that it does so in ways fundamentally
different from the way any new technology challenges prevailing legal defini-
tions and concepts. As discussed below in Part II of this Review, there have
been many instances in which new technologies have re-defined fundamental
legal concepts. The larger, and largely unanswered, question is whether the sort
of theoretical or academic research proposed by the authors can appreciably
accelerate the process by which the law responds to changes in technology.
In the few areas where the book's authors could not reach consensus on
particular recommendations, they offer a range of divergent views. For exam-
23. See id. at 16-17, 216-17, app. F at 304-10.
24. See id. at 17-18, 227-30, app. Dat 271-81.
25. Id. at 9, 205.
26. Id. at 8.
27. Id. at 11-12.
28. Id. at 232-33.
29. Id. at 230-32.
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ple, the authors could not agree on the extent to which mass market license
terms (e.g., those for software) can or should override certain copyright law
doctrines (most notably the fair use doctrine). 30 The authors also failed to reach
consensus on the extent to which the Digital Millennium Copyright Act should
be interpreted or revised to permit a broader range of "legitimate" circumven-
tion activities. 31 The authors correctly note that these are difficult and contro-
versial issues, and some readers will no doubt find the lack of a position taken
on them frustrating, but by the same token, the candor with which the authors
weigh each side and ultimately throw up their hands seems refreshing.
32
Beyond its specific recommendations, several aspects of The Digital Di-
lemma are particularly noteworthy. First, perhaps reflecting the balanced com-
position of the drafting committee, 33 the authors navigate a course that avoids
both an alarmist, sky-is-falling view (the Internet threatens to undermine and
hence will destroy our entire intellectual property system) and, at the other ex-
treme, a simplistic, Pollyannish view (information "just wants to be free," and
technology will eventually cure any problems). Instead, the book adopts a more
reasoned, thoughtful, and nuanced analysis. Without demonizing the Internet
or hyping its benefits, the authors put forth a convincing view that new infor-
mation technologies pose profoundly difficult challenges to our intellectual
property system and threaten to disrupt the careful balances embedded in that
system. By recognizing both the promises and the perils presented by new in-
formation technologies, the authors resist the simplistic urge, sometimes seen
in current policy debates, to present new technologies in purely black-or-white
terms. Like most other new technologies, the Internet and new information
technologies are powerful but essentially value-neutral tools that can be used in
ways that are socially beneficial or socially harmful. By identifying relevant
issues, examining stakeholder interests, and venturing recommendations in a
rapidly changing environment, The Digital Dilemma fills an important gap in
helping policymakers make well-informed and intelligent choices as they con-
front new information technology.
A second noteworthy strength of the book derives from the fact that the
authors practice what they preach about the need to analyze the relevant issues
from a variety of perspectives, including technology, law, economics, business,
and policy. This analytical method avoids the tunnel vision that can accompany
30. See id. at 206.
31. See id. at 222-23.
32. Cf id. at 145 n.40 (describing as "extremely intense" the Committee's deliberations on
whether "copying" is an appropriate benchmark concept in copyright law).
33. See id. at xi; see also id. at 27 ("the members of the study committee were selected to provide
the diverse expertise needed to ensure that stakeholders' wide-ranging perspectives were represented").
Biographical information about the members of the study committee appears in Appendix A of the book.
See id. at 253-60.
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single-discipline approaches and produces a richer, more interesting, and ulti-
mately more complete perspective. To support their analysis, the authors have
provided separate boxes of text or figures that accompany, at appropriate
points, the main body of the report, as well as several detailed, substantive ap-
pendices. The appendices offer clear and in-depth explanations of topics as di-
verse as how the Internet works, information economics, technologies for in-
tellectual property protection, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998. The appendices are written so as to serve not only as practical introduc-
tions for neophytes to the relevant subjects, but also as convenient refresher
courses for more technically sophisticated readers.
Although a few of the book's recommendations are specific and concrete,
such as the proposal that Congress enact legislation to permit copying of digital
information for archival purposes,34 a third noteworthy feature lies in the fact
that, by and large, the book's recommendations focus on the need to re-assess
core concepts and on suggested directions for future research. 35 To the extent
the authors recommend substantive changes, they adopt an evolutionary, or in-
crementalist, approach. 36 For example, on a centrally important issue - the le-
gal status of private, non-commercial copying - the authors conclude that
"[p]roviding additional statutory limitations on copyright and/or additional
statutory protection may be necessary over time to adapt copyright appropri-
ately to the digital environment," but that "[t]he fair use doctrine may also
prove useful as a flexible mechanism for adapting copyright to the digital envi-
ronment."
37
C. Assessing the Digital Dilemma: A Missed Opportunity?
If there is an unfortunate shortcoming to The Digital Dilemma, it is more
one of form than substance. The issues presented are complex and interwoven,
and the book's conclusions are directed to multiple audiences. But if the
promise of the book was at least in large part to "offer[] a framework for the
evaluation and construction of public policy, as well as a variety of specific
conclusions and recommendations designed to help legislators, courts, admin-
istrators, and the public to understand what is at issue, to formulate questions
34. See id. at 10, 210.
35. See, e.g., id. at 225-30 (describing recommendations for further research on illegal commercial
copying, the economics of copyright, use of patents, and intellectual property law).
36. That approach is also consistent with the conclusion of the 1995 Information Infrastructure
Task Force's Working Group on Intellectual Property, which found that "[w]ith no more than minor
clarification and limited amendment, the Copyright Act will provide the necessary balance of protection
of rights-and limitations on those rights-to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. Ex-
isting copyright law needs only the fine tuning that technological advances necessitate, in order to
maintain the balance of the law in the face of onrushing technology." IITF REPORT, supra note 6, at 17
(footnote omitted).
37. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 15, at 12, 215.
Yale Law & Policy Review
clearly, and to assess alternatives," 38 then its most important recommendations
should have been distilled in easily digestible form for the report's intended
audience - legislators, judges, and policymakers, in particular. This need is
more important than ever, given the proliferation of information and ideas
(aided in part by the Internet) and the limited attention key decisionmakers can
give to any but the highest profile issues.
For example, The Digital Dilemma's authors underscore, among other
policy recommendations, the need for a technology-neutral approach, for con-
sideration of all relevant forces in the digital environment, and for simplicity
and comprehensibility in new or revised intellectual property laws, but these
important recommendations do not appear until late in both the book's text and
executive summary.39 The book's "Principles for the Formulation of Law and
Public Policy '40 appear somewhat as an afterthought and are presented without
extensive discussion or elaboration. A road map of the book - at page 60 - also
comes too late. Paradoxically, the book's executive summary, while adequate,
is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because, at
twenty-two pages, it is too lengthy to qualify as a true executive summary (i.e.,
one that sets forth, in a crisp and coherent way, the report's major findings and
recommendations). It is under-inclusive because, despite its length, it presents
the authors' conclusions and recommendations seriatim, without assigning any
sense of relative importance or priority to them, and without capturing the
richness and range of topics covered in the book. For instance, the executive
summary hardly mentions the book's extensive discussion of the myriad of is-
sues raised by digital music.
4 1
A couple of other nits: The brief discussion of the law enforcement chal-
lenges posed by the Internet accurately catalogs the sorts of obvious challenges
presented - difficulty in establishing identity, blurring cues about social con-
texts, and permitting action at a distance 42 - but omits a fuller discussion of the
issues. A fuller discussion of Internet and intellectual property law enforcement
challenges might include the ways in which current laws already apply to un-
lawful conduct involving the use of the Internet and the ways in which law en-
forcement officials can use the Internet to conduct investigations from a dis-
tance and to investigate the identity of unsophisticated users.43 Similarly, the
book's discussion of technical protection mechanisms appropriately focuses on
their technical aspects, 44 but concludes in part with a question-begging state-
38. Id. at 10, 210.
39. See id. at 20-22, 233-35.
40. Id. at 236-38, Box 6.2.
41. See id. at ch. 2.
42. See id. at 49.
43. See, e.g., THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 11, at 17-23; see also id. at app. I (discuss-
ing software piracy and intellectual property theft).
44. See THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 15, at 153-76, app. E at 282-303.
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ment that "[t]echnical protection mechanisms are useful but are not a pana-
cea. '45 Readers interested in a more sophisticated assessment of technical pro-
tection mechanisms will have to wade through much of chapter five of the
book and may still come away unsatisfied.46
One final quibble: The book's title - The Digital Dilemma - is a bit of a
misnomer, for in the context of intellectual property and digital technology, the
fundamental policy question is not a choice between two equally desirable (or
undesirable), mutually exclusive alternatives. That is, the question does not re-
quire a choice between only two alternatives: rewarding intellectual property
creators and owners for their work on the one hand, or, on the other, ensuring
free access to and the sharing of the information so created. Rather, the funda-
mental policy question is how much of a reward, and how much protection
should be granted; the instrumentalist goal is to ensure both that authors and
publishers are rewarded and given incentives to create and disseminate future
works and that the public benefits of information access and sharing (including
that which stimulates future creations) may be realized. This is not the sort of
policy dilemma in which one alternative must be chosen over another; instead,
the alternatives are mutually supportive means between which a balance needs
to be struck so as to achieve the well-recognized long-term instrumentalist goal
of promoting and creating a wide array of informational works.
Indeed, the authors do repeatedly characterize the policy questions as ones
of balance, rather than choice: "The task of intellectual property protection has
always been difficult, attempting as it does to achieve a finely tuned balance:
providing authors and publishers enough control over their work that they are
motivated to create and disseminate, while seeking to limit that control so that
society as a whole benefits from access to the work. ' '47 Nevertheless, the prob-
lem with the book's title is more than just a semantic disagreement or an un-
der-appreciation of literary license - close readers or linguistic purists who are
drawn to the book by its alliterative title are likely to wonder, where is the di-
lemma?
48
In sum, despite its many strengths, The Digital Dilemma could have bene-
45. Id. at 13. Locks and fences are useful mechanisms (but not panaceas) for protecting physical
property, but that obvious analogy is not discussed except in a footnote in one of the appendices. See id.
at 316 n.9.
46. See id. at 153-76. For a readable discussion of these issues, see generally B. SCHNEIER,
SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD (2000).
47. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 15, at 24; see also id. at 2 ("The challenge is in striking
and maintaining the balance, offering enough control to motivate authors, inventors, and publishers, but
not so much control as to threaten important public policy goals"); id. at 22 ("Intellectual property will
surely survive the digital age, although substantial time and effort may be required to achieve a work-
able balance between private rights and the public interest in information").
48. "Dilemma" has, of course, a more general, secondary usage (to mean a problem or predica-
ment), though that meaning still fails to capture the notion of "balance." Perhaps "The Digital Dance:
Intellectual Property in the Information Age" could also have expressed the images of delicate balance
and intricate movement between technology and policy.
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fited from a stronger, more rigorous final edit. The book could well have been
an ideal vehicle for an independent, non-partisan, agenda-setting blueprint for a
new Administration and Congress on a critical topic facing policymakers at all
levels. Unfortunately, without a more forceful executive summary or more
finely honed list of recommendations, the comprehensive perspective and in-
sightful analysis contained in The Digital Dilemma may not reach its intended
audiences. That shortcoming, regrettably, may represent a singular opportunity
lost.
II. LAW AND NEW TECHNOLOGY: THE VIRTUES OF INCREMENTALISM
Whether The Digital Dilemma succeeds as a policy primer or not, it does
contain a central, though easily overlooked, recommendation: "Legislators
should not contemplate an overhaul of intellectual property laws and public
policy at this time, to permit the evolutionary process [involving different
kinds of digital intellectual property, business models, legal mechanisms, and
technical protection services] the time to play out."'49 That suggestion - one of
radical incrementalism - is powerful, both because it is counterintuitive, and
because, when viewed in historical context, it is likely to produce a better
melding of legal principles to new technological developments.
An incrementalist approach - one in which the law evolves through case-
by-case adaptations of existing concepts, mixed with intermittent paradigm-
shifts and legislative intervention - is counterintuitive because of the immedi-
ate and intense pressure on legislators, courts, and regulators to alter intellec-
tual property rules in substantial ways to accommodate with new digital tech-
nologies. 50 A more cautious approach, however, permits courts and
policymakers to understand more fully and accurately the new technology and
its effects before altering fundamental legal concepts. This part of the Review
sketches some preliminary thoughts on the important balance between the need
for laws to change in response to technological developments and the risk of
making incorrect assumptions or predictions about new technologies.
A. Examples of the Law Chasing Technology
Laws and legal institutions have long had to struggle with changes in tech-
nology. Some of the most illustrious instances are also the most infamous: In
1908, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that piano rolls (a precursor tech-
nology to the phonograph) did not infringe copyrights to the original composi-
tions51 - Congress later corrected that ruling in section 1(e) of the 1909 Copy-
49. Id. at 16, 225 (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text.
51. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 12 (1908) (concluding that
"perforated sheets and other mechanical means of automatically producing music audibly are not in-
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right Act.52 In 1915, the Supreme Court held that motion pictures were not
protected by the First Amendment53 - that decision was later overruled.54 In
1928, the Supreme Court famously held that telephone conversations (and
hence wiretaps) were not subject to Fourth Amendment analysis 55 - that deci-
sion was, of course, also subsequently overruled.56 And, in more modern times,
a Georgia court noted (albeit in dictum) in 1996 that "a facsimile transmission
does not satisfy the statutory requirement that notice be 'given in writing,"' be-
cause "[s]uch a transmission is an audio signal via a telephone line containing
information from which a writing may be accurately duplicated, but the trans-
mission of beeps and chirps along a telephone line is not a writing, as that term
is customarily used.",
57
An interesting historical example of the law's struggle with new technolo-
gies is provided by the 19 th century evolution of American tort law, in particu-
lar the rise of the doctrine of negligence. Lawsuits resulting from collisions
between ships or horse-drawn carriages, and cases involving the spread of fire
by sparks from railroad locomotives onto neighboring lands resulted in trans-
formations by courts, which were responding to the rise of a more industrial-
ized economy, of the traditional doctrine of strict liability for damage caused
by property use into doctrines that focused on liability based on carelessness
and causation. 58 The celebrated case of The TJ. Hooper59 is an example of a
court responding to new technology, albeit in a dramatic fashion, rather than an
incremental, evolutionary way: In ruling that tug boat owners were not insu-
lated from liability for harm caused by the failure to carry radio receiving sets,
despite the then-prevailing custom, Judge Learned Hand not only proffered a
fringements of copyrights upon the musical compositions which are thus audibly reproduced").
52. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, ch. 320 (Mar. 4, 1909).
53. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915) (holding
that the First Amendment did not prohibit Ohio from establishing a motion picture censorship board and
characterizing as "wrong or strained" the argument that the free speech and press provisions of the First
Amendment applied to motion pictures).
54. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
55. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (opining that "the reasonable view is
that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his
voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house and messages while passing over them
are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment").
56. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
57. Department ofTransp. v. Norris, 222 Ga. App. 361, 362, 474 S.E.2d 216, 218 (1996), rev'don
other grounds, 268 Ga. 192, 486 S.E.2d 826 (1997). But ef Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487, 488
(1869) (finding a telegraphed contract to be sufficient writing under the Statute of Frauds) ("It makes no
difference whether th[e] operator writes the offer or the acceptance... with a steel pen an inch long at-
tached to an ordinary penholder, or whether his pen be a copper wire a thousand miles long. In either
case the thought is communicated to the paper by use of the finger resting upon the pen; nor does it
make any difference that in one case common record ink is used, while in the other case a more subtle
fluid, known as electricity, performs the same office"); Bazak Inemational Corp. v. Mast Industries,
Inc., 535 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1989) (assuming faxes to be writings under U.C.C. 2-201).
58. See, e.g., MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
85-89, 98-99 (1977).
59. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
Yale Law & Policy Review
bold prediction about the costs and benefits of creating and imposing a new
technology-specific legal standard, but also advanced a more profound con-
ceptual point - that what is legally reasonable under the circumstances can and
should change with changes in technology.
As noted earlier in this Review, modem-day courts and lawyers are simi-
larly struggling to fit new technologies into existing legal conceptual rules and
categories. Here are but a few more examples: The extent to which the First
Amendment protects the export of encryption source code turns in part on the
expressive versus functional nature of such source code. Regulation of inde-
cent material or other material harmful to minors on the Intemet challenges the
traditional ways in which such material is regulated, consistent with free
speech guarantees. And advances in genetic technology have required courts
and legislatures to re-evaluate fundamental concepts of anti-discrimination and
family law.
62
These examples illustrate the fact that the way in which the law (as inter-
preted by courts, as well as positive law in the form of legislative and regula-
tory rules) responds to new technology or to changes in existing technology
can have important consequences. If the law responds too precipitously, market
mechanisms, technological solutions, or other extralegal responses that may
have been more effective may not have an opportunity to develop. More im-
portant, especially if the pace of technological change is rapid, judicial or leg-
islative predictions of or assumptions about how the technology will develop
and affect the law may be wide of the mark. On the other hand, to the extent
judges or legislators wait too long to adapt the law to new circumstances, there
can be societal harms and losses that result from the application of outdated le-
gal rules to the new technology.63 In addition, in the intervening time, societal
60. Compare Kam v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9 n.19 (D.D.C. 1996) (noting that
"source codes are merely a means of commanding a computer to perform a function), with Junger v.
Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding computer source code to be protected by the First Amend-
ment, but remanding for a balancing of national security interests and the interest in free exchange of
encryption code), and Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding
encryption source code to be expressive for First Amendment purposes and concluding that the govern-
ment's prepublication licensing scheme constituted an impermissible prior restraint on speech). See gen-
erally Robert Post, Symposium: Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 713 (2000).
61. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (striking down portions of the Communi-
cations Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 501-502, 505, 508-509, 551-552, 110 Stat. 56, 133-43);
ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming district court's grant of preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 231)).
62. See, e.g., William F. Mulholland, II & Ami S. Jaeger, Genetic Privacy and Discrimination: A
Survey of State Legislation, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 317 (1999); Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d
776 (1993) (determining a child's "natural mother" under California law in the context of a surrogacy
agreement); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (evaluating disposition of the cryogenically
preserved product of in vitro fertilization, commonly referred to as "frozen embryos").
63. Cf KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 518 (1960)




expectations and market structures may become so entrenched that subsequent
legal or policy changes may be either practically impossible or, if undertaken,
socially disruptive. Even if legislative intervention is necessary, it is not always
clear when and to what extent such intervention should occur.
B. The Power ofAnalogies and the Case for Intervention
The argument that legal responses to new technology should generally be
left to the common law processes of incremental, case-by-case adjudication
rests largely on the institutional competence of the judiciary to look beneath
the surface tensions presented by new technological developments and to ar-
ticulate and to apply the underlying bedrock legal principles at stake. Courts
engage in this form of abstract reasoning, typically in the context of an adver-
sarial proceeding involving concrete facts, in part by invoking analogies from
which to analyze the new technological development.
In considering whether the government's interception of telephone conver-
sations was a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, for example, the
Court in Olmstead v. United States64 rejected the analogy that such an inter-
ception was akin to the opening of a sealed letter in the mail. Rather, the Court
reasoned, "[b]y the invention of the telephone, 50 years ago, and its application
for the purpose of extending communications, one can talk with another at a far
distant place... The intervening wires are not part of [the defendant's] house
or office any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.,
65
The Court's property-centric approach to interpreting the Fourth Amendment,
as illustrated by the physical-highway analogy, led to cases in which the Fourth
Amendment analysis turned on bizarre distinctions such as whether the instru-
ment used to intercept the telephone conversation penetrated the defendant's
property or not.66
The dissenters in these cases, and the majority in the case that eventually
overruled Olmstead, recognized that the physical-intrusion approach to ana-
lyzing the interception of telephone conversations under the Fourth Amend-
ment failed to capture the reality of the technology and, more importantly,
failed to give effect to the underlying principles animating the Fourth Amend-
review of a rule wait upon the chance raising and appeal of issues one by one by dragging one");
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 22 (2d ed. 1985) ("The common law is
therefore not only slow; it is impotent to effect certain kinds of significant legal change").
64. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
65. Id. at 465.
66. Compare Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (allowing evidence obtained by use
of a "detectaphone," an instrument that allowed conversations in defendant's office to be overheard
through the wall of an adjoining room, but which did not penetrate the office), with Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (rejecting evidence obtained by use of a "spike mike," which penetrated the
wall of an adjoining house and thus was an "unauthorized physical intrusion").
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ment. 67 That it took several decades for the Court to reach this paradigm-
shifting conclusion illustrates the power and effect an initial analogy can have
on subsequent legal analyses involving new and evolving technological devel-
opments.
In intellectual property and other legal disputes involving the Internet and
modem communication technologies, courts and litigants also often resort to
analogies from the physical world to describe or explain elements of the online
world. Applying the doctrine of "initial interest confusion" in trademark law,
for example, the Ninth Circuit has analogized the use of another's trademark in
a website's "metatags" (keywords embedded in a website's computer code that
are searched when a user employs a search engine to look for certain content
on the Internet) to the posting of a sign with another's trademark in front of
one's store. 68 In disputes involving the use of automated software robots (com-
puter programs that automatically search, copy, and retrieve content from web-
sites on the Internet), courts have granted injunctive relief where the use of
such search robots deprived the targeted computer system's owner of the use of
a portion of its personal property (namely, the computer server and its system
capacity), thereby constituting a trespass to chattels.69 And computer source
code, which, "though unintelligible to many, is the preferred method of com-
munication among computer programmers," has been likened to a musical
score, which likewise "cannot be read by the majority of the public but can be
used as a means of communication among musicians." 70 There are, no doubt,
many other examples of courts invoking similar comparisons between online
67. Justice Brandeis, for example, dissenting in Olmstead, emphasized the kind of intrusions that
technological advances had made possible: "'[T]ime works changes, brings into existence new condi-
tions and purposes.' Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to
the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet."
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Similarly, dissenting in Goldman, Justice Murphy
noted that "science has brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a person's privacy
than the direct and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by our forebears and which in-
spired the Fourth Amendment." Goldman, 316 U.S. at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
And, of course in Katz, the case that overruled Olmstead and Goldman, Justice Stewart flatly ruled that
electronic interception, regardless of whether there was a physical intrusion, constitutes a search or sei-
zure under the Fourth Amendment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); see also id.
at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring) (Goldman's "limitation on Fourth Amendment protection is, in the pres-
ent day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by elec-
tronic as well as physical invasion"). New technology continues to challenge Fourth Amendment con-
cepts to this day. See Kyollo v. United States, No. 99-8508 (U.S. argued Feb. 20, 2001) (reviewing
whether the government's use of a thermal imaging device violates the Fourth Amendment).
68. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th
Cir. 1999).
69. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Compuserve, Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022. A separate but related analogy - between "cyber-
space" and real space - has been the subject of much academic debate. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The
Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1996); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1996).
70. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484 (9 h Cir. 2000).
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technologies and offline analogues to explain their reasoning or to "translate"
values and norms from one context to another.
71
To be sure, the reactive, incrementalist model of common law decision-
making places great weight on a generalist judiciary in fashioning appropriate
responses to new technology. Because judges typically have a generalist back-
ground and, more to the point, may not have scientific or technical training (or
even a background in intellectual property law), they are in many ways the
least likely to be expert in any given area of new technology. In areas where
scientific evidence is presented, for example, courts routinely struggle with the
"battle of the experts," made more difficult in recent years by the Supreme
Court's admonition that trial courts take a more activist role in separating sci-
entific-evidence wheat from scientific-evidence chaff by assessing the proc-
esses and methodologies behind the type of expert evidence at issue.72 The
trepidation expressed by the Ninth Circuit on remand in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is not atypical: "[T]hough we are largely untrained
in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose testimony we
are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those experts' pro-
posed testimony amounts to 'scientific knowledge,' constitutes 'good science,'
and was 'derived by the scientific method.' The task before us is more daunt-
ing still when the dispute concerns matters at the very cutting edge of scientific
research .... Mindful of our position in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary,
we take a deep breath and proceed with this heady task.,
73
On the other hand, their generalist background and the common law con-
text in which they operate may be precisely why courts are in a better position
to ensure that the law responds to new technology in an appropriate way. 74 The
hesitation and humility expressed by courts when dealing with new technology
may in fact be the key to their providing answers that eventually endure. One
appellate court has, for example, warned against "excessive rigidity when ap-
plying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies require a flexible
approach. 75
There are, of course, costs that must be borne while the legal process of
71. The notion of "translation" comes from LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE 111-21 (1999), which has a much more lucid discussion of the Olmstead to Katz line of
cases.
72. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
73. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. de-
nied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995).
74. For observations on how courts respond to cases involving scientific or technological issues,
see Abner J. Mikva, Shotgun Wedding: When Science Went Legal, TECHCOUNSEL 74, Mar. 12, 2001;
Debra Baker, Learning High. Tech @ the Bench, 86 A.B.A.J. 52 (Nov. 2000). The classic work on this
issue is Sheila Jasanoff & Dorothy Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence,
214 SCIENCE 1211 (1981), reprinted in SCIENCE AND LAW: AN ESSENTIAL ALLIANCE 15 (William A.
Thomas ed., 1983).
75. Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1054.
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case-by-case adjudication plays itself out, but the resulting incremental analy-
sis and interpretation of existing law among different courts creates a multi-
party conversation that tends toward mid-course corrections as new facts
emerge and new theories are debated. These corrections serve as feedback to
other law-interpreting or law-making institutions, so that disconnections be-
tween the law and changes in technology do not persist and can be corrected.
Congress responded to the advent of digital audio tape recorders, for example,
with the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992,76 and a district court ruling that
highlighted a gap in existing copyright law led Congress to pass the No Elec-
tronic Theft Act of 1997. 77 It is too soon to know whether these and other more
recent legislative efforts (such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998) have been the right responses to new digital technologies, but it is clear
that the more rapidly the technology or its impacts change, the more critical
this feedback loop is to ensure that the law responds adequately to those
changes.
III. CONCLUSION
This Review commits one of the sins identified in The Digital Dilemma: It
examines the problem of intellectual property law and digital information
largely from a single perspective - a legal/policy perspective - and even then it
does so in a cursory manner. The greatest strength of The Digital Dilemma is
that it is a thorough and thought-provoking analysis of these issues from a vari-
ety of perspectives. Although its format and style make for heavy reading, its
policy conclusions and recommendations are reasoned, coherent, and appropri-
ately cautious of sweeping change or predictions.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (Supp. V 1993) (requiring a serial copy management system in digital
recording devices to permit first generation digital copying of sound recordings, but to prevent the
making of digital copies from copies).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(2) (1997). In United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F.
Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994), the district court dismissed an indictment against a graduate student who
operated an electronic bulletin-board service over the Internet that allowed users to send or obtain copy-
righted software programs. Ruling that the then-existing criminal copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 506, did
not apply because the defendant did not act for "commercial advantage or private financial gain" (an
element of the offense), the court invited Congress to remedy this gap in the law. The resulting statute
creates a new criminal offense that covers the unauthorized distribution or reproduction of copies of
copyrighted works, regardless of whether the distributor intends to profit from the activity.
Another example of a court signaling a legislative gap is Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151 (1975), where the Court considered whether a small fast-food shop that played a radio for
its customers infringed copyrights on the music played to the shop's customers. The dissent noted that
"[there can be no really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here, until Congress acts in re-
sponse to longstanding proposals.... We must attempt to apply a statute designed for another era to a
situation in which Congress has never affirmatively manifested its view concerning the competing pol-
icy considerations involved .... '[The fact that the Copyright Act was written in a different day, for
different factual situations, should lead us to tread cautiously here."' Id. at 167-68 (Burger, CJ., joined
by Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Congress responded by enacting section 110(5) of the
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1976), which provided that the playing of
music under circumstances similar to those in Aiken was not a copyright infringement.
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In discussing whether downloading and sharing copyrighted works through
the Internet constitutes fair use of such works, for instance, the authors note
simply that "[a]nswers may arise over time in piecemeal fashion."78 That ob-
servation, perhaps more than any grand analytic theory or policy framework,
may be the most anyone can say about how the law will respond to the new in-
formation technologies of today. Such an incrementalist approach to law and
new technology, coupled with legislative intervention or judicial paradigm-
shifting when existing doctrines prove unworkable or yield unintended conse-
quences, may ultimately prove to be the best model for ensuring that the law
keeps up with technological change.
78. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 15, at 49.

